A battery in the CAISO balancing area earns mainly from two sources. CAISO settles its market revenue from energy and ancillary services, and load-serving entities pay it under bilateral resource adequacy contracts. This note covers the participation rules behind both and sizes the market revenue with figures from CAISO's Department of Market Monitoring (DMM). Dollar figures are US dollars.
One resource that charges and discharges
Batteries generally participate under the non-generator resource (NGR) model. An NGR submits a single bid curve that runs from negative MW (charging) to positive MW (discharging), and it can switch between the two immediately. CAISO models each battery's minimum and maximum stored energy, its operating limits and its round-trip efficiency, and the market software tracks state of charge from one interval to the next.
The scheduling coordinator steers state of charge with optional bid parameters: upper and lower charge limits in MWh for the trading day, an initial state of charge submitted with the day-ahead bid, and an end-of-hour state-of-charge range. FERC approved the end-of-hour parameter in May 2021, and it applies in real time only.
Ancillary service awards come with an energy test. A storage resource must hold enough charge to deliver its award for one hour in the day-ahead market and for 30 minutes in the real-time market. To be certified for regulation, spinning reserve or non-spinning reserve, a storage resource or a distributed energy resource aggregation needs at least 100 kW of rated capacity; other resources need 500 kW unless they are in a CAISO-approved aggregation. Regulation also needs a direct digital control link to CAISO's energy management system, and an NGR must telemeter its ramp rates for charging and discharging and its maximum instantaneous MW.
Where the revenue comes from
Energy arbitrage is the main earner. DMM describes the typical large battery as a four-hour lithium-ion system that charges in the midday solar hours, when prices are lowest, and discharges into the evening peak. The day-ahead market optimizes over 24 hours. The 15-minute and 5-minute real-time markets then each settle one financially binding interval and treat the rest of their look-ahead as advisory. In 2024 energy made up nearly 82% of battery market revenue.
Regulation pays for capacity, plus revenue from following CAISO's automatic generation control signal in real time. Batteries met 84% of CAISO's regulation up and regulation down requirements in 2024, and they supplied 53% of all CAISO balancing-area ancillary service requirements in 2025. DMM cautions that so much battery capacity competes for a small regulation requirement that a single battery is unlikely to win as much regulation as DMM's own profit-maximization model gives it.
Resource adequacy is paid under bilateral contracts with load-serving entities. The CPUC sets a battery's net qualifying capacity from tests of its sustained output over four hours, and a battery with a longer duration gets no extra credit. A battery that sells resource adequacy takes on a must-offer obligation and must bid its full upward resource adequacy capacity into the market. Since 2025 the CPUC's slice-of-day rules require each CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entity to show capacity in all 24 hours of each month's worst day, and to hold enough surplus energy from non-storage resources to charge the batteries it counts.
Worked example: the 2025 average applied to one battery
Illustrative only, built from DMM figures. In 2025, CAISO balancing-area batteries with a full year of operation earned nearly $35/kW-year from energy and $9/kW-year from regulation. The example applies those averages to the battery DMM uses in its own simulations: 100 MW, 400 MWh, round-trip efficiency 0.85. DMM reports the energy figure beside simulated revenues computed after charging costs, so the example treats it as net of charging. The one-full-cycle-a-day assumption belongs to this example, and real cycling varies.
At one full cycle a day, the 2025 energy average equals a margin of about $24 per MWh discharged. Under these assumptions, the average discharge price would have exceeded 1.18 times the average charging price by about $24/MWh. DMM's profit-maximization model of the same battery, co-optimizing energy and regulation on 2025 day-ahead prices at more than 280 pricing nodes, averaged about $39/kW-year from energy. Resource adequacy contract payments come on top and are not in these figures.
Illustrative: a 100 MW / 400 MWh battery at the 2025 average revenue DMM reports for batteries with a full year of operation, treated as net of charging cost (US$) | Step | Formula | Result |
| Energy revenue | $35/kW-year × 100,000 kW | $3.50 million a year |
| Regulation revenue | $9/kW-year × 100,000 kW | $0.90 million a year |
| Energy discharged | 400 MWh × 365 cycles (assumed) | 146,000 MWh a year |
| Net energy margin | $3,500,000 ÷ 146,000 MWh | $23.97 per MWh discharged |
| Energy bought per MWh sold | 1 ÷ 0.85 | 1.18 MWh |
What changed recently
Revenue per kW fell while the fleet grew. Battery capacity in the CAISO balancing area rose from about 500 MW in 2020 to about 13,000 MW in December 2024, and across CAISO and the Western Energy Imbalance Market it reached about 25,700 MW by the end of 2025. For CAISO batteries with a full year of operation, net market revenue fell from $103/kW-year in 2022 to $78 in 2023 and $53 in 2024. DMM attributes the 2024 drop mainly to lower peak prices and lower loads.
The rules moved with the fleet. FERC accepted CAISO's energy storage enhancements on 1 June 2023, and since November 2023 the market has modeled how regulation awards drain or fill a battery, using attenuation factors that CAISO updates each quarter. New bid cost recovery rules for storage took effect on 1 December 2024 to curb unwarranted real-time uplift payments; batteries received $17.9 million of real-time bid cost recovery over 2024, and their share of all bid cost recovery in the CAISO balancing area fell from 13% in 2024 to 5% in 2025. On 1 May 2026 CAISO and PacifiCorp launched the Extended Day-Ahead Market, which brought day-ahead imbalance reserves. In May 2026 imbalance reserve prices in the CAISO and PacifiCorp East areas were below $5/MWh in more than 90% of hours.
Reviewed by Sergey Syrvachev on 12 October 2026.