CAISO

Wholesale design: nodal energy, ancillary-service, and day-ahead flexibility market with a multi-BAA Extended Day-Ahead Market, embedded in a state-led bilateral resource-adequacy framework.

Coverage
California, United States
Nominal frequency
60 Hz
Operator
California Independent System Operator

Energy trades in three layers

Layer Scheduling Settlement
Day-Ahead Market Hourly awards with fifteen-minute granularity introduced through market enhancements where applicable Locational marginal pricing for energy and ancillary-service marginal prices
Extended Day-Ahead Market Multi-balancing-authority-area day-ahead optimization with hourly energy and reliability-capacity awards and day-ahead procurement of fifteen-minute-dispatchable imbalance reserves Locational marginal pricing for energy and product-specific marginal prices for imbalance reserve and reliability capacity
Real-Time Market (mandatory) Fifteen-minute market and five-minute real-time dispatch Locational marginal pricing for energy and ancillary-service marginal prices

Ten ancillary services

A missing line means the source does not state that value — never that the value is zero.

Scroll the table sideways for the rest of the columns →

10 ancillary-service products in CAISO, grouped into 5 families. Each row runs left to right through one product's life: how it activates, how quickly it has to respond, how long it has to keep delivering, and how it is bought.
Service How it activates Response Sustained delivery Procurement
Regulation
Regulation Down Response type Pre-contingency continuous Trigger Continuous regulation range around the resource operating point Dispatched by Automatic generation control; control signals are typically issued about every four seconds No deadline established Certification and ramp capability determine the awarded regulation range; the operator sources reviewed do not support one universal full-response duration for every resource. As the source describes it The tariff requires regulation capacity to be continuously dispatchable for at least sixty minutes in the Day-Ahead Market and at least thirty minutes in the Real-Time Market; one universal duration would be misleading. Through Day-ahead; real-time Pricing design Capacity and mileage components under CAISO regulation settlement rules
Full record for Regulation Down — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Follow automatic control signals to correct downward area-control error and frequency deviations.

What the source does not state

The source states a delivery duration in its own words. It does not state a response time, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Regulation Up Response type Pre-contingency continuous Trigger Continuous regulation range around the resource operating point Dispatched by Automatic generation control; control signals are typically issued about every four seconds No deadline established Certification and ramp capability determine the awarded regulation range; the operator sources reviewed do not support one universal full-response duration for every resource. As the source describes it The tariff requires regulation capacity to be continuously dispatchable for at least sixty minutes in the Day-Ahead Market and at least thirty minutes in the Real-Time Market; one universal duration would be misleading. Through Day-ahead; real-time Pricing design Capacity and mileage components under CAISO regulation settlement rules
Full record for Regulation Up — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Follow automatic control signals to correct upward area-control error and frequency deviations.

What the source does not state

The source states a delivery duration in its own words. It does not state a response time, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Contingency reserve
Non-Spinning Reserve Response type Post-contingency Trigger Qualified non-synchronized capability that can be synchronized and reach the award within ten minutes Dispatched by CAISO dispatch instruction; resource begins responding within one minute Expected within 10 min Minimum obligation At least 30 min Through Day-ahead; real-time Pricing design Ancillary-service marginal price
Full record for Non-Spinning Reserve — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Provide offline or otherwise non-synchronized contingency reserve after a qualifying disturbance.

Checkpoint recap

Expected within 10 min · Minimum sustained 30 min

What the source does not state

The source states the response deadline and a minimum delivery period. It does not state a maximum duration, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Reliability Capacity Down RCD Response type Pre-contingency reliability commitment Trigger Downward difference between the integrated forward-market schedule and the residual-unit-commitment reliability requirement Dispatched by Awarded hourly in residual unit commitment and available for dispatch through the Fifteen-Minute Market No deadline established Awards are limited by a resource's sixty-minute ramp capability. That is a capability basis, not a real-time activation deadline. Through Day-ahead residual unit commitment Pricing design Market-cleared Reliability Capacity Down price in residual unit commitment
Full record for Reliability Capacity Down — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Procure downward capacity in residual unit commitment to manage potential oversupply when the day-ahead energy schedule is above the operator's forecast requirement.

Notes from the source

RCD is an operational day-ahead reliability product. It is not California Resource Adequacy capacity and is not a long-term capacity auction.

What the source does not state

It does not state a response time or how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Reliability Capacity Up RCU Response type Pre-contingency reliability commitment Trigger Upward difference between the integrated forward-market schedule and the residual-unit-commitment reliability requirement Dispatched by Awarded hourly in residual unit commitment and available for dispatch through the Fifteen-Minute Market No deadline established Awards are limited by a resource's sixty-minute ramp capability. That is a capability basis, not a real-time activation deadline. Through Day-ahead residual unit commitment Pricing design Market-cleared Reliability Capacity Up price in residual unit commitment
Full record for Reliability Capacity Up — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Procure upward capacity in residual unit commitment so resources remain available when the day-ahead energy schedule is below the operator's forecast requirement.

Notes from the source

RCU is an operational day-ahead reliability product. It is not California Resource Adequacy capacity and is not a long-term capacity auction.

What the source does not state

It does not state a response time or how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Spinning Reserve Response type Post-contingency Trigger Synchronized unloaded capability available to restore supply-demand balance following a contingency Dispatched by CAISO dispatch instruction; resource begins responding within one minute Expected within 10 min Minimum obligation At least 30 min Through Day-ahead; real-time Pricing design Ancillary-service marginal price
Full record for Spinning Reserve — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Provide synchronized contingency reserve after a qualifying disturbance.

Checkpoint recap

Expected within 10 min · Minimum sustained 30 min

What the source does not state

The source states the response deadline and a minimum delivery period. It does not state a maximum duration, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Ramping reserve
Imbalance Reserve Down IRD Response type Pre-contingency flexibility Trigger Downward uncertainty between the day-ahead and real-time markets; resources must be dispatchable in the Fifteen-Minute Market Dispatched by A day-ahead award creates a real-time must-offer obligation; awarded capability is available to the Fifteen-Minute Market. No deadline established Awards are limited by a resource's thirty-minute ramping capability. That capability horizon is not recorded here as a universal activation deadline. Through Integrated forward market Pricing design Locational marginal price for Imbalance Reserve Down
Full record for Imbalance Reserve Down — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Reserve downward flexible ramp capability in the day-ahead market for uncertainty and variability between day-ahead schedules and real-time net load.

What the source does not state

It does not state a response time or how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Imbalance Reserve Up IRU Response type Pre-contingency flexibility Trigger Upward uncertainty between the day-ahead and real-time markets; resources must be dispatchable in the Fifteen-Minute Market Dispatched by A day-ahead award creates a real-time must-offer obligation; awarded capability is available to the Fifteen-Minute Market. No deadline established Awards are limited by a resource's thirty-minute ramping capability. That capability horizon is not recorded here as a universal activation deadline. Through Integrated forward market Pricing design Locational marginal price for Imbalance Reserve Up
Full record for Imbalance Reserve Up — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Reserve upward flexible ramp capability in the day-ahead market for uncertainty and variability between day-ahead schedules and real-time net load.

What the source does not state

It does not state a response time or how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Reactive power & voltage
Voltage Support Response type Continuous or directed Trigger Facility-specific voltage schedule and reactive capability Dispatched by Automatic voltage control or CAISO instruction Expected within 60 s Through Tariff-based or contractual Pricing design Tariff-based compensation rather than a uniform co-optimized reserve price
Full record for Voltage Support — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Maintain transmission-system voltage and reactive-power needs.

Checkpoint recap

Expected within 60 s

What the source does not state

The source states the response deadline. It does not state how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources
Black start & restoration
Black Start Response type Restoration Trigger System restoration following a blackout or widespread outage Dispatched by CAISO restoration instruction and approved restoration plan Through Contractual Pricing design Contract or tariff compensation
Full record for Black Start — document bound, page for these figures not recorded
What it is for

Start without external station power and support system restoration.

What the source does not state

It does not state a response time or how long delivery has to be sustained, and the volume is either set per auction or not published as a standing figure — the source does not say which.

Sources

Every value above comes from the official sources listed in that product's full record. Most products cite more than one, and the published sources do not say which of them states each individual value, so the binding is to the product's record rather than to a single document.

CAISO has no central capacity market

California Resource Adequacy program

State and local regulatory authorities establish obligations; load-serving entities contract bilaterally and make showings to CAISO. CAISO's Capacity Procurement Mechanism is a backstop designation process, not a routine centralized capacity auction.

Unit of obligation
MW of qualifying capacity shown by load-serving entities
Auction held in 2025
No — No capacity auction for this market was found to have been held during 2025 in the sources reviewed.

How a battery earns money in CAISO

A battery in the CAISO balancing area earns mainly from two sources. CAISO settles its market revenue from energy and ancillary services, and load-serving entities pay it under bilateral resource adequacy contracts. This note covers the participation rules behind both and sizes the market revenue with figures from CAISO's Department of Market Monitoring (DMM). Dollar figures are US dollars.

One resource that charges and discharges

Batteries generally participate under the non-generator resource (NGR) model. An NGR submits a single bid curve that runs from negative MW (charging) to positive MW (discharging), and it can switch between the two immediately. CAISO models each battery's minimum and maximum stored energy, its operating limits and its round-trip efficiency, and the market software tracks state of charge from one interval to the next.

The scheduling coordinator steers state of charge with optional bid parameters: upper and lower charge limits in MWh for the trading day, an initial state of charge submitted with the day-ahead bid, and an end-of-hour state-of-charge range. FERC approved the end-of-hour parameter in May 2021, and it applies in real time only.

Ancillary service awards come with an energy test. A storage resource must hold enough charge to deliver its award for one hour in the day-ahead market and for 30 minutes in the real-time market. To be certified for regulation, spinning reserve or non-spinning reserve, a storage resource or a distributed energy resource aggregation needs at least 100 kW of rated capacity; other resources need 500 kW unless they are in a CAISO-approved aggregation. Regulation also needs a direct digital control link to CAISO's energy management system, and an NGR must telemeter its ramp rates for charging and discharging and its maximum instantaneous MW.

Where the revenue comes from

Energy arbitrage is the main earner. DMM describes the typical large battery as a four-hour lithium-ion system that charges in the midday solar hours, when prices are lowest, and discharges into the evening peak. The day-ahead market optimizes over 24 hours. The 15-minute and 5-minute real-time markets then each settle one financially binding interval and treat the rest of their look-ahead as advisory. In 2024 energy made up nearly 82% of battery market revenue.

Regulation pays for capacity, plus revenue from following CAISO's automatic generation control signal in real time. Batteries met 84% of CAISO's regulation up and regulation down requirements in 2024, and they supplied 53% of all CAISO balancing-area ancillary service requirements in 2025. DMM cautions that so much battery capacity competes for a small regulation requirement that a single battery is unlikely to win as much regulation as DMM's own profit-maximization model gives it.

Resource adequacy is paid under bilateral contracts with load-serving entities. The CPUC sets a battery's net qualifying capacity from tests of its sustained output over four hours, and a battery with a longer duration gets no extra credit. A battery that sells resource adequacy takes on a must-offer obligation and must bid its full upward resource adequacy capacity into the market. Since 2025 the CPUC's slice-of-day rules require each CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entity to show capacity in all 24 hours of each month's worst day, and to hold enough surplus energy from non-storage resources to charge the batteries it counts.

Worked example: the 2025 average applied to one battery

Illustrative only, built from DMM figures. In 2025, CAISO balancing-area batteries with a full year of operation earned nearly $35/kW-year from energy and $9/kW-year from regulation. The example applies those averages to the battery DMM uses in its own simulations: 100 MW, 400 MWh, round-trip efficiency 0.85. DMM reports the energy figure beside simulated revenues computed after charging costs, so the example treats it as net of charging. The one-full-cycle-a-day assumption belongs to this example, and real cycling varies.

At one full cycle a day, the 2025 energy average equals a margin of about $24 per MWh discharged. Under these assumptions, the average discharge price would have exceeded 1.18 times the average charging price by about $24/MWh. DMM's profit-maximization model of the same battery, co-optimizing energy and regulation on 2025 day-ahead prices at more than 280 pricing nodes, averaged about $39/kW-year from energy. Resource adequacy contract payments come on top and are not in these figures.

Illustrative: a 100 MW / 400 MWh battery at the 2025 average revenue DMM reports for batteries with a full year of operation, treated as net of charging cost (US$)
StepFormulaResult
Energy revenue$35/kW-year × 100,000 kW$3.50 million a year
Regulation revenue$9/kW-year × 100,000 kW$0.90 million a year
Energy discharged400 MWh × 365 cycles (assumed)146,000 MWh a year
Net energy margin$3,500,000 ÷ 146,000 MWh$23.97 per MWh discharged
Energy bought per MWh sold1 ÷ 0.851.18 MWh

What changed recently

Revenue per kW fell while the fleet grew. Battery capacity in the CAISO balancing area rose from about 500 MW in 2020 to about 13,000 MW in December 2024, and across CAISO and the Western Energy Imbalance Market it reached about 25,700 MW by the end of 2025. For CAISO batteries with a full year of operation, net market revenue fell from $103/kW-year in 2022 to $78 in 2023 and $53 in 2024. DMM attributes the 2024 drop mainly to lower peak prices and lower loads.

The rules moved with the fleet. FERC accepted CAISO's energy storage enhancements on 1 June 2023, and since November 2023 the market has modeled how regulation awards drain or fill a battery, using attenuation factors that CAISO updates each quarter. New bid cost recovery rules for storage took effect on 1 December 2024 to curb unwarranted real-time uplift payments; batteries received $17.9 million of real-time bid cost recovery over 2024, and their share of all bid cost recovery in the CAISO balancing area fell from 13% in 2024 to 5% in 2025. On 1 May 2026 CAISO and PacifiCorp launched the Extended Day-Ahead Market, which brought day-ahead imbalance reserves. In May 2026 imbalance reserve prices in the CAISO and PacifiCorp East areas were below $5/MWh in more than 90% of hours.

Reviewed by Sergey Syrvachev on 12 October 2026.

Sources for these notes

  1. CAISO Department of Market Monitoring, 2024 Special Report on Battery Storage (29 May 2025) (read 2026-10-12)
  2. CAISO Department of Market Monitoring, 2025 Annual Report on Market Issues and Performance (June 2026) (read 2026-10-12)
  3. CAISO Tariff, Appendix K: Ancillary Service Requirements Protocol (as of 3 August 2024) (read 2026-10-12)
  4. FERC, Order on Tariff Revisions, Energy Storage Enhancements, 183 FERC ¶ 61,161, Docket ER23-1533 (1 June 2023) (read 2026-10-12)
  5. FERC, Order Accepting Tariff Revisions, storage bid cost recovery, 190 FERC ¶ 61,047, Docket ER25-576 (24 January 2025) (read 2026-10-12)
  6. CAISO news release, EDAM is live: PacifiCorp and CAISO successfully launch new market May 1 (2026) (read 2026-10-12)
  7. CAISO Department of Market Monitoring, memorandum to the WEM Governing Body on May 2026 EDAM performance (11 June 2026) (read 2026-10-12)

Common questions about CAISO

Where does energy trade in CAISO?
Energy in CAISO trades in three layers: Day-Ahead Market, Extended Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market. Participation in Real-Time Market is mandatory. Scheduling and settlement, where the cited sources give them, are in the table above.
What ancillary services can a battery sell in CAISO?
Ten ancillary services are listed for CAISO: Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Non-Spinning Reserve, Reliability Capacity Down, Reliability Capacity Up, Spinning Reserve, Imbalance Reserve Down, Imbalance Reserve Up, and 2 more. Response timing, direction and eligibility for each are in the table above; a product's full record lists the official sources behind it.
Does CAISO have a capacity mechanism?
No central capacity market. One capacity/adequacy arrangement is listed for CAISO: the California Resource Adequacy program.
Who operates CAISO?
California Independent System Operator operates CAISO, covering California, United States.
Was a qualifying capacity event held in CAISO in 2025?
No. California Resource Adequacy program: no qualifying 2025 event is recorded. No capacity auction for this market was found to have been held during 2025 in the sources reviewed.
How is energy traded, priced and settled in CAISO?
Nodal energy, ancillary-service, and day-ahead flexibility market with a multi-BAA Extended Day-Ahead Market, embedded in a state-led bilateral resource-adequacy framework.

Official sources

Capacity-mechanism explainer

Current as of · from the Global Electricity Market Catalogue v1.2.0 (compiled to , CC BY 4.0, rendered here with wording edited for readability). Facts belong to the linked official authorities; verify the current rules before design or bidding decisions.

Every market, one map.

The markets index holds the full set. For what the grid demands of a battery here, see the grid-code ride-through atlas.

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